

The artifice of independence: Reconsidering the labour movement in Zimbabwe to 2001

Rushil Ranchod

This paper examines the ambiguous and changing relationship between the labour movement and the ruling party in Zimbabwe and in doing so seeks to posit a framework into which the nature of this changing relationship may be examined. This framework is best conceptualised through the lens of political and economic liberalisation. These twin processes have dictated the contours of struggle that have emerged, and as will be seen in the discussion below, have worked interchangeably in forming the bedrock on which opposition and resistance in Zimbabwe is premised. The pivotal role played by the labour movement in resistance to authoritarianism – exercised by both the colonial and independent state – augments Bratton’s contention that the greatest challenge to authoritarian rule emerges from the capacity of collective action of the working class. That the working class through trade unions effect both formidable organisation “and a leadership capable of mounting a bid for political power”, cannot be disputed.¹

Given this, the discussion below is divided into four sections. The first examines the formation and role of the labour movement before independence was achieved in 1980, and provides the basis on which the relations between the ruling party and labour movement, both pre- and post-independence, may best be conceptualised. As will become evident, the relations between the independent state and the labour movement maintain certain similarities with that of the colonial regime, despite the exigencies of political liberalisation. The second and third sections of this paper analyse the political and economic trajectory of the labour movement in the post-independence epoch and examines the shift from a relationship of cooptation of the labour movement by the state, to one characterised by ideological disagreement and increasing antagonism. The analytical framework here takes due cognisance of the role of capital in the determination of labour regulation and the effect it had on shaping relations between the state and labour movement. The examination in the fourth section explicates the outcome of the antagonistic relations between the state and the labour movement, witnessed by the formation of a broad-based opposition movement to the incumbent state. While such opposition incorporated various actors in civil society, stress is given to the centrality of the labour movement in the formation and direction of such opposition.

Colonialism to Independence: Examining the role of the Labour Movement

To understand the contemporary relations between the state and labour movement in Zimbabwe, it is necessary to reflect on the manner in which colonialism negotiated and regulated relations between labour and the state and entrenched an inimical system of labour subordination. Indeed, under colonialism, African workers were kept in a position of subservience to both capital and the state with no allowance made for the formation of trade unions to represent their interests in collective bargaining for higher wages and improved conditions of service. Instead, individual contracts were entered into and operated ‘voluntarily’ between master and servant, and an inequitable and harsh system of penalties was placed on workers deemed to have contravened these contracts. While evidence suggests that workers sought nascent collective support in

forming trade unions - state intervention to ban and disperse meetings, arrest leaders and wide-scale intimidation vitiated these attempts.²

After 1945, black workers, through sustained demands and an increase in worker organisation and industrial action, were able to form recognised trade unions and become part of the institutional framework for regulating labour relations. The promulgation of the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) in 1959 legislatively allowed the rights of union formation and collective bargaining to be extended to black workers. Moreover, it mandated representation of black workers to be equal to that of employers on industrial councils and on the industrial boards, which negotiate legal agreements.³ While this Act purported to be non-racial in principle, in practice, it was directed to control black trade unions. The provisions of the Act encouraged the formation of fragmented unions by allowing for union branches to be delineated by race. Furthermore, the extent of the restrictions placed on union activity made strike action practically illegal.⁴ To compound this, the black trade union movement of the 1960s retained weak membership and collective bargaining power, and throughout this period strikes were suppressed and trade unions strictly controlled. For Wood high levels of poverty and increased job insecurity militated against the rapid expansion of trade unions. Further, labour migration as well as low levels of education complicated the matter.⁵ An additional factor which weakened the labour movement was the disunity between several competing federations, each competing perennially with each other, continuing through to independence.⁶

Thus, the lack of 'political clout' to paraphrase Stoneman and Cliffe, was not due merely to a lack of broad membership or a fissiparous federation, but was intimately linked to the promulgation of the ICA which succeeded in its aim of emasculating the black trade unions. Corporate paternalism characterised the relations between labour and state in this period, and the drive to emasculate the labour movement was to some, a measure directed at preventing unions from developing links with the nationalist movement.⁷

But disagreement exists on whether it was merely the state that prevented the formation of links between the labour and nationalist movement. According to Astrow, the petit-bourgeoisie trade union movement, nationalist leadership, as well as capital and the state, were all to blame for the continuance of colonialism and the exploitation of black workers.

The role of the trade union leadership combined with sustained repression by the settler regime, helped to ensure that the struggle of the African working class was safely contained. The trade union bureaucrats worked actively to lead their members in a pro-capitalist direction and, to limit the struggle of the rank and file to the narrow economic of wage arbitration. This proved decisive in dissipating the struggle of the working class.⁸

He continues, and to quote him at length:

The political weakness of the African working class made it incapable of preventing the continued degradation of the national struggle by the petit-bourgeoisie leadership of the nationalist movement. The working class could not appreciate its own leading role in the struggle for national independence in a country oppressed by imperialism. Its economic struggles therefore became separated from the political struggle for national self-

determination. As a result the national aspirations of the working class stayed under the domination of petit-bourgeoisie nationalism.⁹

The motivation then, for the withdrawal of the labour movement from the political struggle is ultimately premised on the belief that union engagement in strictly political issues would only serve to augment and encourage the repressive measures by the state. Politics had to be left to the nationalist movement. Mswaka's presidential address to the Southern Rhodesian African Trade Union Congress captures the sentiment of the union leadership at this time. He posited that:

It is high time all of us realised that we cannot use this organisation as a political platform for our political ends. I hate to have a political boss in the Trade Union Movement...politicians must stop interference into Trade Union affairs...and stop wrecking this organisation.¹⁰

While these statements clearly indicate the position of the labour movement in engagement with political issues, the sub-text of this statement also contends that they misread the complexities affecting the labour movement under Rhodesian colonialism. While it is true that the nationalist movement subsumed trade unions within the broader struggles for independence; unions themselves were actively engaged, if not directly in the political struggle, then in a continuing economic struggle against colonial capitalism. Indeed, it had never been quite possible to separate the economic struggles from political struggles, and under colonialism especially, the "convergence between the two was quicker than under normal conditions of capitalism or post-colonial struggles".¹¹ Therefore, the separation of politics from economic struggle is not possible. As will be seen below, it is precisely the confluence of these struggles, which places the labour movement at the fore of contesting relations of power.

Moreover, by accepting that there is a convergence of struggle in the political and economic realm, the labour movement, despite its weaknesses expounded above, needed to be seen as a non-compliant and political body. Indeed, Brand posits that regarding the relationship between the nationalist parties and the unions, there can be no doubt "as to the basic identification of the labour movement with nationalist aspiration".¹² Given that unionists were generally younger and more militant than political leaders, unions were central agents in promoting the nationalist cause.¹³ It is ironic that successive governments in Rhodesia contributed to the politicisation of unions through their repressive handling of industrial action. As a consequence of the ICA, which tacitly placed control of the union in the state, the colonial government became increasingly seen as the "enemy of the workers".¹⁴

While the labour movement engaged in the struggle for independence, they were reticent in forsaking their autonomy. Given the experiences of Ghana and Tanzania, unions aimed to maintain a supportive, but separate role from political parties. As radical union leader, Maluleke stated:

We as a trade union are fully prepared to throw our weight behind the nationalist party's fight – after all, we all want to get rid of the present minority government, but we want *to do so as workers with our own organisation*. For after independence, the party will be the government and will be as much concerned as any government to increase production and

develop the country. This may happen at the expense of workers' wages and general standards of living. *Then we want our own organisation to defend our position and our rights; if we, then are merely an arm of the party we as workers will be defenceless.* (my emphasis)¹⁵

The prescience underscoring this quote becomes apparent when cognisance is taken of the relationship between the ruling nationalist party and the labour movement after independence. The examination above, has sought to conceptualise the tenuous relationship between the state, nationalist party and labour movement in the pre-independence period. In the section that follows, a critical analysis of this relationship will be undertaken after independence in 1980. It will be contended that that much of the forewarning that Maluleke posits in the quote above, was actually realised in the immediate post-independence epoch.

Independence and the crisis of expectation

When the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) assumed power in independent Zimbabwe in 1980, it did so with the promise to redress colonial injustice and bring about a socialist transformation with greater worker and peasant participation.¹⁶ But such promise was marked by a deeper ambivalence between the ruling party and the role it accorded to the labour movement. Such ambivalence was evident when Robert Mugabe declared:

In the private sector, there is little we can do for now. We don't want to disrupt the economy. But of course we are interested in the *role of the worker, in his being organised so that he becomes more effective as a producer...* (my emphasis)¹⁷

This comment highlights the position of the ZANU-PF government. It elucidates their awareness of the fact that the African working classes potentially posed the most central threat to (continuing colonial) capitalist stability. Thus, state interest in the organising and regulating the working class stemmed from the need to increase industrial efficiency and capitalist profitability.¹⁸ Moreover, the ambivalence of state-labour relations was epitomized when Mugabe intimated:

[...] *the country is based on free-enterprise and is therefore capitalist.* [...] workers will be established into various committees which have a management role... First we must study the position of the workers. The trade union movement is very weak in this country. It has always been, and it is necessary to promote a unitary movement rather than a multiplicity of national movements (my emphasis)¹⁹

Evident above, is the immediacy with which the new state sought to develop a system of industrial relations to suit their own administrative convenience, much like the colonial powers had done. This move is indicative of the subordinate relation that the labour movement had within the state. Thus, the state supported the formation of unions through a 'guided democracy', and soon after independence ZANU-PF ventured to capture control of the labour movement and incorporate trade unions under the direction of the state. Such a venture was largely successful, as the union movement was still fragmented and disorganised. Further, the involvement of opposition supporters within the labour movement provided the state with additional impetus to actively intervene.²⁰

The need to exercise control over the labour movement was precipitated by a widespread upsurge in strike action across the country between 1980-81, which affected all major economic sectors. The ‘gaping vacuum’ in the inherited labour relations structure meant that there was an absence of strong regulatory mechanisms to channel the interests and demands of workers and to mediate relations between capital and labour.²¹ Moreover, the strike action needs to be seen as a reaction to the political conditions of suppression and the economic framework of exploitation that continued from the pre-independence era.²² It was also, essentially, an indication of the “level of expectation and will for change amongst workers”.²³

Worker demands were centred largely on wage increases and better working conditions, and the concomitant economic impact from the strike action was considerable. Government reaction initially came by an assurance to reform collective bargaining structures, but then took a tougher stance by “sending police against some strikers and threatening stronger measures as it declared workers’ needs were to be subsumed to the ‘national interest’ and workers’ demands should be ‘reasonable’ in order to encourage investment”.²⁴ As Mugabe noted:

Strikes do more harm than good. We don’t need to retard economic progress [...] There are some bad eggs in the union movement [...] There are some people in the unions movement who go out looking for difficulties, and try to be difficult. We will watch them and closely and discourage striking as much as we can.²⁵

This is the broad context in which the new elements for the regulation of labour had to be introduced. While a weak trade union movement served the object of the colonial regime, it was a serious liability to the incumbent state. As Sachikonye notes, the recourse to state corporatism in the wake of the industrial action was motivated partly too, by the ‘lack of clout’ unions had in restraining militancy among workers.²⁶ The most direct form of such corporatism was the interventionist role that the state played in passing a series of minimum legislation pertaining to wages and working conditions, and importantly, in the creation of the umbrella union federation, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The aim of reconstructing the labour movement and introducing a legal framework for the regulation of labour was essentially to contain industrial conflict through direct state intervention in the labour movement. Indeed, the conditions placed on ZCTU to allow it to pursue union activities were based on the need to accept the authority of the ZANU-PF government.²⁷

However, from independence to the mid-1980s, these state corporatist arrangements were based on a ‘pact’ between capital, the state and ZCTU; the latter being the weaker partner in this relationship.²⁸ The definition and control of minimum wage prescriptions were placed at the discretion of the state, and the drawing up of the paternalistic Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1985 reinforced, rather than superseded, certain authoritarian aspects of the previous ICA which it was envisaged to do. The provisions of the new Act, while establishing advances for workers’ rights, had the overall effect of centralising power of the unions with the Minister of Labour.²⁹ This was achieved by giving government the right to intervene in the administration of unions, fix wages, annul collective bargaining agreements if such agreements were deemed not to be in the national interest, and remove the right to strike from those sectors deemed to be ‘essential services’. Moreover, all unions had to apply to the government to obtain the right to strike.³⁰

These repressive measures and the cooptation of the labour movement were part of the commitment by the government and ruling party to “the maintenance of a well-disciplined and fully productive labour force”.³¹ It is evident from this, that the actions of the government underscore a social reality in which the balance of power was heavily weighted in favour of the incumbent state.

It could be argued that as a consequence of these measures, the relations between the state and the labour movement began to change by 1984. Together with internal maladministration and a corrupt union leadership, tensions within the union movement were made more explicit. Moreover, these tensions were exacerbated by a leadership struggle within the movement between the incumbent leadership faction who supported the continued allegiance of the ZANU-PF led state, and those who advocated labour movement autonomy from the state. With a worsening of economic conditions and a prolonged recession from 1982-84, the continuation of state paternalism was questioned.³² In 1985, the ousting of the pro-ZANU union leadership by that faction professing autonomy led by Morgan Tsvangirai saw the adoption of a more critical stance towards the state’s labour and economic policies, and the distancing of the labour movement from the governing party.

While the political liberalisation of Zimbabwe saw an ambiguous and perhaps tenuous relationship develop between the state and the labour movement, the accompanying economic liberalisation, especially through the imposition of structural adjustment policies, augmented the critical and antagonistic stance of unions toward the state. In the section that follows, an analysis of the effects of these policies on the union movement will be undertaken and it is contended that it was the imposition of these policies which offered the fillip for the emergence of ‘combative unionism’.

Zimbabwe’s guiding hand

From the discussion above, it is evident that the labour movement went from a position of weakness and subservience to the state, to one that was increasingly in opposition to the state. Throughout the decade after independence, the labour movement in Zimbabwe increased its membership and grew in strength and this, coupled with the autonomy of the union federation, did not escape the attention of the state which made overt attempts again at co-opting the labour movement. These overtures were resisted by labour, and the growing polarisation between the state and the unions was augmented by the imposition of austerity programmes in 1990.

While economic and social policy had already started experiencing major changes since 1986, the imposition of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) represented a “volte-face in ZANU-PF’s largely theoretical commitment to socialism, and retreat from social redistribution measures” such as free health and education services which were provided for in the post-independence period.³³ This volte-face, and the defence of capitalism which ensued, signalled the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the emerging bureaucratic and state-linked African elite and their White counterparts based in industry and agriculture.³⁴ It is important to note that economic liberalisation was not merely the result of the external influence of international financial institutions, but also the transformation of the petit-bourgeoisie who were “in the process of transforming themselves into a bourgeoisie proper through the utilisation of opportunities made possible by access to state resources”.³⁵

For the labour movement, which had already rescinded state corporatist arrangements, the shift to neo-liberalism had a significant impact in their opposition to economic policy. The ZCTU noted:

The Government's strategy of staking the people's hopes on World Bank structural adjustment policies [...] ignores the evidence of the devastating effects of these policies on working people across the globe and dooms a vast section of the society to permanent joblessness, hopelessness and economic insecurity.³⁶

Much to the prediction of the ZCTU, the imposition of ESAP was accompanied by the substantial retrenchment of workers, due in part to the restriction of cumbersome procedures and the removal of safeguards from the labour relations legislation which prevented arbitrary hiring and firing. ESAP failed to create the jobs it purported to, and this was coupled with decreasing real wages and the commensurate social hardships the working class now faced. The populist struggle was enhanced by the sharp decline in living standards and general social malaise that affected the broader society. The heightened tensions between the labour movement, capital and the state, placed labour in a precarious position, especially regarding the threat by the state to use coercive measures in the absence of a corporatist strategy.³⁷

Economic liberalisation therefore had the effect of creating further tensions with unions who viewed it as a mechanism to weaken the strength and unity of the labour movement and reverse the few material gains since independence, such as job security and subsidies on social services. Ironically however, while ESAP was associated with phasing out the statutory minimum wages and the imposing freer collective bargaining procedures, it thereby allowed a strengthening of the unions' position by gaining considerable concessions from management, even though the Minister of Labour retained the right to veto wage agreements if it was in the "national interest".³⁸

Thus, placing this inadvertent bargaining power with labour, together with the general decline in social security, it is not surprising that differences over production politics spilled over into the wider political arena. Coming to the fore also, were the political differences between the ZCTU leadership and the state on issues of human rights and democracy. Heavily opposed to the moves within ZANU-PF towards the creation of a one-party state since the 1980s, the ZCTU also derided the widespread corruption and repressive actions by the government. ZANU-PF, now suspicious that the labour movement's economic and political critique could translate into the formation of an opposition party, actively sought means to weaken the labour federation and individual unions.³⁹

In 1992, amendments were made to the LRA to reverse the 'one union, one industry' policy and measures instituted to decentralise collective bargaining, which made lawful strike action almost impossible. Moreover, the LRA sought to strengthen managerial prerogative at both plant and national levels for the process of deregulating labour conditions.⁴⁰ In reaction to this, the labour movement organised country-wide demonstrations against both the LRA amendments and the ESAP austerity measures. While the fears that the labour movement would form a direct opposition movement at this stage were unfounded, unions did seek to build grassroots structures

at the regional level promoting women's issues and cooperation with other mass organisations and professional associations.⁴¹

It is evident from the preceding discussion that the imposition of the structural adjustment programme in Zimbabwe, not only heightened the social malaise of the working classes, but as a consequence, also fomented the growth of a nascent, broad-based opposition movement, central to which was the trade union federation. In the section that follows, analysis will centre on the growth of this opposition movement and the circumstances that precipitated the formation of an organised opposition party to contest the hegemony of ZANU-PF. As witnessed in the previous sections, the political-economic nexus is central to understanding the rise of the opposition movement.

'Chinja Maitiro' and beyond¹

The limits of the structural adjustment strategy under ESAP and the unsuccessful attainment of the targets set were clearly evident when it was reviewed at the end of 1995. Moreover, the wider political context was marked by ZANU-PF's consolidation of a one-party state. The widening gap between the state and labour movement, and the subordinate position accorded to ZCTU, promoted labour to adopt a different approach in 1995-96. While the development of the second phase of ESAP was being undertaken, the ZCTU offered proposals for an alternative programme of economic reform, even though the continued dependence on structural adjustment was inevitable. Tsvangirai notes, "[...] over the past five years, we have realised that criticising ESAP is not the best we can do. The government is committed to the programme, and we do not see it getting out".⁴²

Beyond ESAP, as the alternative proposal was entitled, was premised on the idea of 'bargained liberalisation' which attempted to "engage the state and capital in institutional structures, which would be used to set the form and pace of adjustment".⁴³ Seeking not to be marginalised again from policy debates, the strategic reasoning behind labour's proposals was the need to shift the debate from the political sphere to the economic one within a social democratic framework. Thus, it was posited that the tripartite engagement – between state, business and labour – would allow for the development and exploration of common grounds of interest. Labour, as the quote above serves to indicate, broadly accepted the case made for the improvement of the economy through adjustment. This rapprochement between the labour movement and the state was based on the pro-active engagement by the ZANU-PF government with labour's proposals, with tempered headway being made on certain issues.⁴⁴

However, this rapprochement was short-lived. In 1996, a large public sector strike allowed for relations between ZCTU and the Public Sector Association (PSA) to be cemented. ZCTU lobbied for a collective bargaining system and fairer dispute resolution mechanisms for this sector. The intensity of the strike action escalated into a national crisis that reflected the growing politicisation of labour relations. The tone of these strikes became increasingly confrontational, with some strikers predicting the impending fall of the government.⁴⁵ This confrontational mood was inflamed by the state declaring the strike illegal, detaining union leaders and refusing to negotiate. The government interpreted the strike action as a political challenge rather than an industrial dispute, and when ZCTU called for solidarity demonstrations and a national strike, the

¹ This is the slogan adopted by the MDC meaning "change your ways"

state threatened military intervention and introduced a ban on demonstrations, thus signalling the failure of broader strike action.⁴⁶ What is important to this analysis of this strike is that it was called in alliance with broader civil society organisations including churches, human rights and student groups. These alliance groups would later constitute the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

ZCTU's imperative to align itself with these groups stemmed from the fact that despite the gains it had made, its supine position in affecting economic policy still remained. Therefore, ZCTU sought a political solution to the growing economic crisis. The failure of the state's initiative to construct a consultative framework for policy through the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF) and the labour movement's withdrawal from the forum precipitated the need for the formation of political alliances.⁴⁷

This new strategy of co-opting broader organs of civil society, and the labour movement's move into political unionism was mandated in 1998, it was held that:

There is a need to go beyond the worker and integrate the ordinary people. It was said to be vital for ZCTU to go out there and be involved in all levels of change, at the same time being strongly organised. *Worker's issues become community issues*. As much as linkages and networking with other civic groups is important, we should be able to control and direct [the] social movement to maintain direction.⁴⁸

Thus, in the move towards political unionism, ZCTU became the central agent in the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), with its central objective being to lobby for constitutional reform. The labour movement's centrality in the NCA located it at the heart of opposition politics. In 1999 the ZCTU increased its political campaign and facilitated the National Working People's Convention (NPWC) which would "critically analyse issues through discussion based on society's views and experiences, and identify together how best to improve the current situation for the betterment of every Zimbabwean regardless of political affiliation, race, tribe, colour or creed".⁴⁹ Dansereau asserts that the mandate of the NPWC was essentially to map out strategies that would protect workers from the prevalent harsh economic conditions and, forming a strong democratic and 'popularly-driven' organised people's movement.⁵⁰ In September 1999 it was resolved at a ZCTU congress that the union, together with other popular groups, would give its support for the NPWC to become a fully-fledged opposition party and contest the elections held in 2000 on the MDC platform. So, while trade unions led the organisation, labour was but one of a number of organisations which constituted the broad political alliance of popular classes of this movement.⁵¹

The immediate impact of this coalition was met by violence and antagonism by the ZANU-PF government after its loss of the constitutional referendum in 2000. From 1999, and in a bid to consolidate its support base, the MDC made inroads into rural communities through the trade union structures, white commercial farmers' public sector workers and the structures of the NCA.⁵² The penetration of ZANU-PF's traditional support base was met by wide scale retribution by the state, and was compounded by farm occupations by war veterans aligned to the government. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage with the formal political processes in which the MDC engaged, but it should be noted, that the impact and immense strength of MDC

was felt in the Parliamentary elections in which it won 46 percent of the vote (as opposed to ZANU-PF's 48 percent).⁵³ The significance of this is that for the first time since independence in 1980, an opposition party with a strong working class base but one which also was appealing to a range of interests challenged the hegemony of the incumbent regime.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the relationship between the state and labour movement from colonial Rhodesia to independent Zimbabwe. Suppressed and subordinated by the state apparatus during colonialism, the supine labour movement demonstrated resolve in abetting the nationalist movement in attaining independence. The effect of political and economic liberalisation was the construction of a relationship marked initially by cooptation and accommodation to antagonism and conflict. The resulting development of combative unionism, as Dansereau has called it, emerged as a reaction to the increased authoritarianism exercised by the ZANU-PF government. This 'combativity' led to the extension of the labour movement's role into direct oppositional politics with the incorporation of other civil society groupings.

The involvement of the labour movement in struggles for political change highlights the important role and potential it exercises for political alternatives. For the labour movement however, the challenge remains in re-defining its role in the post-MDC phase. While the MDC has become the political opposition to the incumbent government, the ZCTU has to manoeuvre a strategic relationship with the MDC. As unionists have warned, the MDC should not forget that the "core of its leadership comes from the labour movement and we expect them not to forget where they come from".⁵⁴ It is envisaged, that while the MDC engages the state on the political level, the ZCTU should engage the state through economic and social policy. The form of such engagement however, would still need to be determined.

¹ Bratton, M 'Civil Society and Political Transitions In Africa' in Harbeson, J, Rothchild, D and Chazan, N (eds), *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Lynne Reinner: Boulder, 1994), 60-61

² Shadur, M *Labour Relations in a Developing Country: A Case Study on Zimbabwe* (Ashgate Publishing: Aldershot, 1994), 55 – 57. The author draws on a wide range of sources to make this contention.

³ Shadur, *Labour Relations in a Developing Country: A Case Study on Zimbabwe*, 59

⁴ Astrow, *A Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way?* (Zed Press: London, 1983), 21

⁵ Wood, B 'Trade Union Organisation and the Working Class' in Stoneman, C (ed) *Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State and Capital* (London: MacMillan Publishers, 1988), 286-287

⁶ Shadur, *Labour Relations in a Developing Country: A Case Study on Zimbabwe*, 60

⁷ Stoneman, C and Cliffe, L *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society* (Pinter Publishers: London, 1989), 104

⁸ Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way?* ,20

⁹ Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way?* ,20

¹⁰ Cited in Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way?* ,22

¹¹ Sachikonye, L 'State, Capital and Trade Unions' in Mandaza, I (ed), *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986* (Dakar: Codesria, 1986), 251

¹² Brand, C 'Politics and African Trade Unionism in Rhodesia since Federation', *Rhodesian History* 2, (1971), 107

¹³ Sachikonye, L 'State and Social Movements in Zimbabwe' in Sachikonye, L (ed) in *Democracy, Civil Society and the State: Social Movements in southern Africa* (Harare: Sapes Boks, 1995), 131

¹⁴ Brand, C 'The Political Role of Unions in Rhodesia', *South African Labour Bulletin* 1 (9), 1975, 30

¹⁵ Cited in Shadur, *Labour Relations in a Developing Country: A Case Study on Zimbabwe*, 63

- ¹⁶ Dansereau, S 'Labour and Democratisation: Potential of Labour's Political Challenge in Zimbabwe', Paper presented at "Reconceptualising Democracy and Liberation in Southern Africa" Conference, Windhoek, July 2002, 3
- ¹⁷ Cited in Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way?*, 175
- ¹⁸ Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way?*, 175
- ¹⁹ Cited in Stoneman and Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*, 105-6
- ²⁰ Shadur, *Labour Relations in a Developing Country: A Case Study on Zimbabwe*, 99-100
- ²¹ Sachikonye, L 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation' in Beckman, B and Sachikonye, L (eds) *Labour Regimes and Liberalisation: The Restructuring of State-Society Relations in Africa*, (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publication, 2001), 149
- ²² Sachikonye, 'State, Capital and Trade Unions', 252
- ²³ Raftopoulos, B 'Beyond the House of Hunger: The Struggle for Democratic Development in Zimbabwe', Paper presented at the African Seminar, Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, May 1992, 26
- ²⁴ Dansereau, 'Labour and Democratisation: Potential of Labour's Political Challenge in Zimbabwe', 3
- ²⁵ Cited in Sachikonye, 'State and Social Movements in Zimbabwe', 137
- ²⁶ Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 149
- ²⁷ Dansereau, S 'Liberation and Opposition in Zimbabwe', in Melber, H (ed) *Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa: The Unfinished Business of Democratic Consolidation* (HSRC Press: Cape Town, 2003), 28
- ²⁸ Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 150
- ²⁹ Stoneman and Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*, 107
- ³⁰ Dansereau, 'Labour and Democratisation: Potential of Labour's Political Challenge in Zimbabwe', 5. For a broader explanation of the provisions and effects of the LRA of 1985, see Sachikonye, 'State, Capital and Trade Unions', 259-263
- ³¹ Van Der Walt, L, 'Trade Unions in Zimbabwe: For Democracy, Against Neo-liberalism', Paper presented at the Workshop on Comparing Experiences of Democratisation in Nigeria and South Africa', Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, June 1998, 17
- ³² Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 151
- ³³ Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 153
- ³⁴ Van der Walt, 'Trade Unions in Zimbabwe: For Democracy, Against Neo-liberalism', 8
- ³⁵ Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 154. Also, Van der Walt, 'Trade Unions in Zimbabwe: For Democracy, Against Neo-liberalism', 8
- ³⁶ Cited in Raftopoulos, B 'The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe' in Raftopoulos, B and Sachikonye, L (eds) *Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe, 1980-2000* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2001), 8
- ³⁷ Raftopoulos, Beyond the House of Hunger: The Struggle for Democratic Development in Zimbabwe', 30
- ³⁸ Van der Walt, 'Trade Unions in Zimbabwe: For Democracy, Against Neo-liberalism', 13
- ³⁹ Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 155-57
- ⁴⁰ Sachikonye, 'State and Social Movements in Zimbabwe', 144
- ⁴¹ Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 157
- ⁴² Cited in Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 160. Also, Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe', 10
- ⁴³ Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe', 10
- ⁴⁴ Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 160
- ⁴⁵ Dansereau, 'Labour and Democratisation: Potential of Labour's Political Challenge in Zimbabwe', 7
- ⁴⁶ Dansereau, 'Labour and Democratisation: Potential of Labour's Political Challenge in Zimbabwe', 7. Also, Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe', 11
- ⁴⁷ Dansereau, 'Labour and Democratisation: Potential of Labour's Political Challenge in Zimbabwe', 7. Also, Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe', 11
- ⁴⁸ Cited in Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe' 14
- ⁴⁹ Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe', 16
- ⁵⁰ Dansereau, 'Labour and Democratisation: Potential of Labour's Political Challenge in Zimbabwe', 8
- ⁵¹ Dansereau, 'Labour and Democratisation: Potential of Labour's Political Challenge in Zimbabwe', 9-10
- ⁵² Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe', 17

⁵³ Sachikonye, 'The State and the Union Movement in Zimbabwe: Cooptation, Conflict and Accommodation', 163.
Also, Kangoro, B 'The Opposition and Civil Society' in Cornwell, R (ed) *Zimbabwe's Turmoil: Problems and Prospects* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series, September 2003), 7-25

⁵⁴ Cited in Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe', 23