In 1974, ideas to built a tunnel linking England and French was gathered, but they were abandoned (Ricard Anguera, 2006). In 1986, Anglo-French Treaty was signed, and the project was started in which this project was expected to create a fixed transportation link between England and France to provide an alternative high-speed and effective transportation method to the existing modes (planes and ferry boats). Transmanche Link (TML) was awarded contract with which Eurotunnel was declared owner of 55-year concession for the link (Michael Grant, 1997). Initially, the project was estimated at US$5.5 billion and was estimated to be completed by May 15, 1993 (Leslie Allen Veditz , 1993). The channel tunnel is 32-mlle (51.5 km) long with double-rail tunnel to accommodate both through-trains and special car-and-truck-carrying shuttle trains beneath the English Channel at the Strait of Dover which shorten the distance between England and France. Furthermore, channel tunnel also have a train that can operate at up to 99mph (160 km/h) (Alina Dumitrache, 2010). This of course will save time most of the passengers that travel from England to France or vice versa. Channel Tunnel can operates a fleet of 25 shuttle trains to transport cars, coaches and trucks and their drivers and passengers (Alina Dumitrache, 2010). Half of the trains transports cars and other low vehicles in double-deck wagons, while coaches buses and other high vehicles travel in the single-deck rake at the front of the train (Alina Dumitrache, 2010) which increase the efficiency compared to the existing modes (planes and ferry boats). Overall the channel tunnel is built as a linkage between France and England.The project ended and being handed over fully operational on December 15, 1994 (Genus, 1997) which is 19 months late from the expected date and the cost overruns almost US$14 billion.Section 2: Strategy Alignment The Channel Tunnel project started in the fourth quarter of 1987 with the winning proposal was made under a ‘build-own-transfer’ (BOT) arrangement, granting Channel Tunnel Group and Franche Manche (CTG-FM) (which then form Eurotunnel Group) the concession to run the project. In July 1985 the British contractors formed Translink Contractors and the French consortium formed Transmanche Construction which then they both formed TML and was awarded a ‘design/build/comission’ construction contract. TML organisation consist of 10 contractors together with five banks, making 15 founder shareholders from both England and France (Michael Grant, 1997). These 10 contractors already have international experience of tunneling and mechanical/electrical engineering works representing thousands of kilometers (Pierre-Jean Pompée, n.d ) and is known for its use of advanced project management tools and technique. Wide experience of these 10 contractors in tunneling project together with 5 banks is the best joint ventures to manage this project.Channel Tunnel was expected to operate in 1993, so they were all under time pressure to complete the project in time. Hence, to ensure the project finished in time, the management group employed almost 15000 workers in total both in England and France (Leslie Allen Veditz.,1994). Apart from that, technologies were also used where giant boring machines were used to shift tonnes of rock and soil every day. Some of the machines were built especially for the job, with a combination of extremely high pressure water jets and rotating disc cutters used to burrow through the land beneath the Channel (Eurotunnel, n.d). The machine were operated on an open-face mode with a front excavating section and a rear gripper unit which acted as a temporary anchor point when the cutting head drove forward at 1.5m increments (Pierre-Jean Pompee, n.d).The initial cost estimation of the project was around $5.5 billion (Leslie Allen Veditz , 1993). As per the Channel Tunnel Treaty, the Chunnel project would have to be financed from private sources without government aid or loan guarantees. They therefore devised a financing scheme to help them tide the crisis: the scheme would provide for the cost of the tunnel to be finance by $5.5 billion worth of bank loans, with additional $1.5 million equity from the owner, institutional investors and public offering (Channel Tunnel Project, 2015). Equity 1 worth $47.5 million was raised by cash placement by the founding shareholders. Equity 2, worth $206.5 million, came from both British and French investment institutions. They later came up with Equity 3, worth $770 million, and raised it by way of public share offering through the Paris and London stock exchanges concurrently. (Michael Grant, 1997).One of the best moves the TML requested of the Channel Tunnel Group/FranceManche (CTG/FM) was to require the use of fixed-price contracts (Michael Grant, 1997). The use of fixed-price contracts for subcontracted work would assist with trying to keep the costs overruns in check with the budget for the project and not require the CTG/FM to spend additional money as the burden would lie with the subcontracting companies (Guth, 2009, p. 40).Section 3: Management of Risk One of the risk that was faced by the management is the total death toll (Chen-Yu Chang and Graham Ive, 2007). Towards 1990, total death for this project increase significantly and was at an alarming rate. The governments and the peoples were definitely not happy with the death rate that occur during the construction. In one case of death that occur, the government issued two prohibition notices which have stopped the operation of the two tunnel-boring machines on the marine tunnels. It can be seen that the death accident that occur had cause trouble to the project management as they not only have to face and react to the people, media especially but the construction process also delay. This led for the management to put safety at the construction sites under intense scrutiny. DuPont’s safety practices and principles was embraced, and a few innovations to its safety plan was made. A series of mainly one-to-one audits were carried out by the foremen and supervisors on the workers at work. These were no-risk audits, and the workers was encouraged to tell the auditor of his observed actions that were less safe than desired and was also encouraged to make safety suggestions. Completed audits identifying the auditor were analyzed by a senior line manager and summarized for the local line manager to identify trends and plan follow up actions (Byrd, 1996). As a result, many previously unidentified safety issues were found and subsequently resolved. Other than that, poster campaigns were carried out to address safety issues such as track safety and proper PPE. These campaigns were complemented by other form of media such as safety notes in payslips, on site video presentations and toolbox briefings to all employees (Stephen Guth ,2009). Section 4: Conclusions: Evaluation of Project SuccessTo evaluate the project success, both technical and financial management must be taken into account. The Channel Tunnel was expected to be fully operate on May 15,1993 but it only can fully operate on December 15,1994.It was 19 months delay from the expected date, but for this kind of high magnitude project the project management can be proud of with this period achievement. The most significant delays was cause by IGC which was appointed by the government to supervise construction and operation of the Channel Tunnel. As an example, for safety reasons, IGC decided to widen the doors from 600mm to 700mm but the final approvals were still not decided (Stephen Guth, 2009). To keep on schedule, the contractors have to continue the project. When the IGC finally made the decision, they already had delayed the project for 9 months. Instead of the delay, the cost of the 100mm-change was almost $79 million (Ricard Anguera, 2006). It can be seen that the failure of the IGC to incclude earlier the decision in the initial scope of the project cause this things to happen.Overall, most of the delays and cost overruns that occur is not because of the failure of project management. They are all out of reach from the project management power and nothing they can do. A likely cause of why project management can do nothing is because IGC was given considerable power over making important decisions and demanding changes whenever necessary. Due to its project complexity and the technologies at that time, we cannot critize the project too much. The Channel Tunnel was predestined to have difficulties to be completed due to its uniqueness. Furthermore, suitable cases are not available at all for the managers and contractors as a reference. Even though it was completed a year late and at least cost overrun is 80%, the Channel Tunnel can still be considered a success, this in the view of the management, technical and financing challenges faced by all parties throughout the project.